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I
n the spring of 2010, strikes that broke out in the Honda factory in
Foshan and the Toyota factory in Nanhai, and the growing number of
suicides at the Foxconn factory in Shenzhen, attracted the attention of
the international press. 
These were not the first strikes to take place in factories situated in the
Pearl River Delta, however. Since the arrival of foreign companies that
transformed the region into the “world’s workshop,” a number of labour
disputes have taken place. These are a fairly rare occurrence in the Peo-
ple’s Republic, all the more so since the right to strike, which had been le-
galised at the request of Mao Zedong, was removed from the 1982 Con-
stitution. Despite this, as early as 2004-2005, a wave of strikes occurred
in factories in Shenzhen, and most observers agree that these disputes
played an important role in the local government’s decision to increase
the minimum wage. (1) Similarly, on the eve of the 2008 financial crisis,
many labour disputes occurred in factories making goods for export, and
these were settled by fairly discreet concessions on the part of manage-
ment.
Things were very different last year. The 17 suicides that took place be-
tween January and August 2010 in a Foxconn factory in Shenzhen em-
ploying 400,000 workers made the front page of Guangdong newspapers
and the international press, which heaped opprobrium on the Taiwanese
managers of the plant that makes the famous iPhones. Following the
scandal arising from these events, the management announced three
salary increases within a month, with the pay of assembly line workers al-
most doubling to reach 2,000 yuan a month. (2) Similarly, the wave of
strikes that shook Japanese and Taiwanese factories in the Pearl River
Delta last spring also attracted the attention of the world’s press. Unrest
that began at a Honda factory in Foshan spread to another Honda factory
in Zhongshan and then to a Toyota factory in Nanhai and to many facto-
ries working for the automobile industry. These movements resonated
throughout the region as well as throughout the country and the world.
The Internet propagated the grievances of the workers, expressions of
support for their struggle multiplied, the international press published in-
numerable articles on the subject, and the Prime Minister himself re-
proached Japanese bosses for paying salaries that were too low. (3) Could
it be that a workers’ movement had appeared in China? A year after the
events, the answer is ambivalent.
A new working class?
Belonging to a new generation of workers (most of them aged between
18 and 30), the dagong mei (打工妹) and the dagong zai (打工仔) born after
1980 (known in China as the baling hou 八零後) are different from their
elders. Those earlier workers (mostly young women) could not find jobs in
the country and were forced to leave their native Hunan or Sichuan to es-
cape poverty and support their parents or send a young brother to school,
and the monetary rewards they received from factory work were so dis-
proportionate to anything they could have hoped for back in their villages
that they were satisfied with very little. 
The same is not true of today’s young workers. Born into much smaller
families than their parents as a result of the one-child policy, they bene-
fited from the attention of their entire family during childhood. This means
they received a secondary education, and most have a high-school
diploma. For example, of the workers born after 1980, 67.2 percent have a
high school diploma, that is to say, 18.2 percent more than the preceding
generation. (4) Although born in the countryside, they are familiar with
“modern life” through television, and like many of their peers they are In-
ternet fanatics. Many of them went to vocational schools (中專 -
Zhongzhuan) during their studies and they are not satisfied with the un-
skilled assembly-line work that is their lot (5) – all the more so since this
type of work is very badly paid (around 800 yuan a month in the Delta be-
fore last year’s labour movement). Contact with the realities of factory life
is, for most of them, a great disappointment: long days (ten hours a day,
six days a week, to which is added overtime that is not always paid at the
legal rate), salaries that are very low compared to ever-increasing living
costs, life in a hostel with seven to ten to a room, the absence of leisure
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activities, etc. This situation is all the more difficult to bear since these
young workers have different aspirations from their parents and hope to
rise in the hierarchy. Whilst 93 percent of their elders are married, only 59.9
percent of these young people have done so. (6) Moreover, since 74.1 per-
cent of them went directly from school to factory, a path followed by only
35.4 percent of their elders, they do not consider themselves peasants in
the same way; they have no experience of tilling the land and feel ill at ease
in the village. According to official statistics, workers born after 1980 repre-
sent around 60 percent of all migrant workers or nongmingong (農民工). (7)
They have different attitudes as well as different lifestyles. They often
have mobile phones and are able to access the Internet, and whilst their
parents had very little contact with their townspeople when they left to
work in other regions, these young people keep in touch with their friends
through QQ and other social networks. As they have friends in many of the
industrial regions of the People’s Republic, they are immediately aware of
differences in working conditions and pay in the various factories, and they
do not hesitate to leave their jobs to go elsewhere when they learn of bet-
ter conditions. We are therefore dealing with a more educated and adven-
turous working class with no affective attachment to its employer. The
turnover rate in the workforce is therefore extremely high. 
This tendency to leave a job when conditions are unsatisfactory is rein-
forced by demographic development. Indeed, it has been calculated that
by 2015, the working population will begin to decline, in particular the
number of 15-to-24-year-olds who make up the core of the workforce in
factories producing goods for export. Naturally, manpower will remain
plentiful, but it is likely that this relative reduction will allow workers to
defend their interests better against management. Already, the entrepre-
neurs of the Pearl River Delta, faced with difficulties of recruitment after
the 2011 Chinese New Year, have begun offering perks to newcomers in
the employment market. (8)
New militant workers
In these companies, most workers live in hostels belonging to the factory,
where they are often grouped by place of origin. Here, young workers have
an opportunity to discuss their working conditions and pay and to express
their indignation at the petty attitude of bosses and the injustices that
occur. Housing conditions such as these provide excellent breeding-
grounds for collective movements of discontent. (9) In addition, the addic-
tion of young workers to modern methods of communication allows them
to exchange information on the situation in other factories and to be
aware of protest methods developing in them. All this has allowed them to
emerge from the isolation that characterised their parents’ situation. These
conditions explain the emergence of new activists and new forms of ac-
tion. The wave of strikes that took place last spring in foreign companies in
various regions of China is a consequence of the emergence of this new
working class, which possesses new characteristics:
• Movement outside of official unions 
In the Honda factory in Foshan where the unrest began on 17 May 2010,
the workers who started the protest did not consult their trade unions,
which they knew well to be a mouthpiece of the Party and always on the
side of management. Indeed, the Party and local government cadres are
keen to attract foreign investment, since promotions are linked to in-
creases in the domestic product of the region they govern. When the
women workers went to the factory to present their demands on 31 May,
they were clubbed by municipal union thugs (wearing yellow helmets,
ironically). A worker described it thus: 
At this critical moment, our great trade union did nothing for us. In-
stead they just wanted us to go back to the production line! Is this
what a union should be doing? You take 5 yuan from our monthly
wages for union dues, but look what you’ve done for us! (10)
The workers elected representatives to negotiate wage increases with
the bosses. At Honda, for example, in the Foshan factory where spare parts
for automobiles are made, they elected 16 representatives (including
many young women), who succeeded in obtaining a raise of 35 percent. 
In state factories, striking workers were also seen confronting members
of official unions. At a cotton garment factory in Pingdingshan, Henan
Province, a fairly traditional state company, workers who went on strike to
demand wage increases became embroiled in violent clashes with union
members who had come to subdue them. (11)
• Taking the official discourse literally
Similarly, the Foshan strikers and the organisers of the movements that
shook China last year took care not to exceed the limits imposed by the
authorities. They refrained, for example, from creating autonomous unions,
since they knew the fate that awaited those who tried to do so. In their
open letter, the strikers’ representatives expressed themselves thus: “And
lastly, [we demand] the restructuring of the union branch of the company
manufacturing Honda vehicle parts.” (12) On the contrary, therefore, they
were demanding the “reconstruction of the unions,” and referenced official
discourse on the need to defend one’s rights. Similarly, taking the Commu-
nist Party discourse quite literally, they used it to defend their interests:
Honda is a Japanese company and Japan is a capitalist country. But
China is supposed to be a socialist country! The Japanese compa-
nies investing in China must follow the rules of China. Implement
socialism! Do not give us capitalism! (13)
A new protest repertoire 
The repertoire chosen by the workers who led the spring strike move-
ments shows that they are very much in touch with the latest develop-
ments in protest movements launched by other social categories in recent
years. For example, at Foshan, they called on people to join a “collective
walk” (集體散步 - jiti sanbu), an order evidently inspired by the protest
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movement by members of the Xiamen middle classes against the PX
chemical factory in 2007, and by Shanghai residents against the extension
of the Maglev, the high-speed magnetic train, in 2008. At the time, to avoid
being accused of organizing illegal demonstrations (in China, all requests
to organise protests in accordance with the law are systematically re-
fused), the protesters called on the inhabitants to “walk” near the munici-
pal council offices in Xiamen, and near the Maglev site in Shanghai. In
other cases, workers called for a “sleep-in” (集體睡覺 - jiti shuijiao) on the
assembly lines, a new form of go-slow against which foremen could do
very little. (14) Others learnt “collective tourism” (集體旅遊 - jiti lüyou), a
form of action adopted by angry peasants in Hebei in 2006. On 10 May
2010, a group of women workers from a factory belonging to the Baobai
Group in Baoding all wore T-shirts of the same colour and went “sightsee-
ing” in Peking to protest against pressures put on them to resign. (15)
The choice of this new repertoire shows that strikers had for many
years been observing the protest methods of discontented people all
over the country. They knew quite well that the Party never stops repeat-
ing that “stability is paramount” and that any request to organise a
protest meets with refusal from Public Security and often brings trouble
to the person making the request. They therefore use “the weapons of
the weak” – weapons that have already proved their worth in other cir-
cumstances – and remain within the boundaries of official discourse, as
James C. Scott has observed, to put forward their demands. This self-im-
posed restriction can, of course, originate with the players themselves,
but it is also the result of observing past labour movements. Of course,
the description of these movements is not found in a press that is sup-
posed to obey the injunctions of the Party; it is because they regularly
surf the Internet that the new activists have become aware of these
types of action.
The role of new technologies
One of the characteristics of last year’s wave of strikes was that it was
contagious. It was a contagion that affected not only the Pearl River Delta,
but also spread to other regions with a concentration of factories working
on goods for export. For example, whilst May and June brought a total of
27 strikes in Guangdong, 73 broke out in the industrial zone of Dalian. The
movements occurred mainly in Japanese-owned companies and spread via
Internet and SMS. 
The strike on 17 May at Honda was called through the sending of text
messages. It was also through SMS that certain workers persuaded their
co-workers not to go back to work until their demands were met. At the
same time, workers launched discussions on sites such as www.workers.cn
where they exchanged information on strikes. The movement then spread
to other factories in the group. Workers at the lock factory in Zhongshan,
for example, followed events on the Net and used this means of commu-
nication to publicise their struggle: “We videotaped the strike with our cell
phones and decided to post the video online to let other people know how
unfairly we were treated.” (16) They also described the brutality of thugs in
the pay of bosses, which led to strikes by other workers in other factories
belonging to other groups. 
Exchanges via Internet, weibo (the Chinese Twitter), and SMS make up
for the absence of organisational resources. Modern communication tech-
niques allow information to circulate between players, and the victory of
the Delta strikes has led many workers in other regions to launch social
movements as well. The use of such techniques makes contagion easier. (17)
The Nanhai workers, for example, who called a strike in the factory where
they make locks for Honda, created a QQ account called “Union is
Strength” through which they circulated information on the strike. This ac-
count was consulted by journalists, lawyers, and rights defenders and made
a major contribution to publicising their action and putting pressure on
both management and government. 
The remarkable victory of the 2,000 Foshan workers led other workers to
strike at Honda, Toyota, and other companies. The movements developed by
sector and by region. From 17 May until the month of July 2010, there were
20 strikes in the automobile spare parts factories of the Pearl River Delta. 
However, the Internet also enabled this movement to reach other re-
gions such as the industrial zone of Dalian in Liaoning, at the other end of
the country. It is important to note that out of 73 strikes occurring be-
tween May and August 2010, 48 involved Japanese companies. (18) Al-
though waves of strikes have occurred several times in this zone (mainly in
1994 and in 2004-2005), last year’s was the biggest since its creation. The
strikes lasted between half a day and 14 days, and on average workers ob-
tained salary increases of 34.5 percent (around 300 yuan). It is clear that
workers decided to down tools because they learnt of the victory of work-
ers in Nanhai and Foshan on weibo, the Net, or by mobile phone. The
elected representatives of the Foshan workers indicated their awareness in
their open letter: 
We must maintain a high degree of unity and not let the represen-
tatives of Capital divide us. This factory’s profits are the fruits of our
bitter toil . . . This struggle is not just about the interests of our 1,800
workers. We also care about the rights and interests of all Chinese
workers.
This wave of strikes may be considered part of the new generation of so-
cial movements. (19)
Methods influenced by the rights defence
movement
The use of the Net to denounce abuses is characteristic of the rights
defence movement that arose in 2003. But last year’s strike move-
ment also borrowed other elements from this movement. From the
very outset of their action, for example, the activists appealed to Chi-
nese and foreign media, and the former indeed covered events at the
beginning.
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On the other hand, they sought to impose respect for the law. Many ac-
tivists studied labour law on the Internet and used it to back up demands
that payment for overtime should be respected, for example.
Like their counterparts in the rights defence movement, the Honda strik-
ers also turned to researchers and university professors. Li Xiaojuan, a 19-
year-old worker who was one of the 16 representatives elected to negoti-
ate with the Honda management, telephoned Chang Kai, Director of the
Centre for Research on Labour Relations at the People’s University of Bei-
jing to ask him for help negotiating with the bosses. The following day,
Chang Kai flew to Foshan and agreed to advise them free of charge. After
six hours of negotiations, they obtained a salary increase of 35 percent. (20)
A social movement?
The wave of strikes that hit China last year undoubtedly represents a
milestone in the history of labour relations in the People’s Republic. The
fact that these events made the front page of newspapers the world over
does not, however, constitute sufficient grounds for announcing the birth
of a labour movement in the People’s Republic. Indeed, if one applies
Charles Tilly’s criteria, by which a social movement is “a sustained chal-
lenge to state authorities in the name of a population living under the ju-
risdiction of those power holders, by means of repeated public displays of
the numbers, commitment, unity, and worthiness (21) of that popula-
tion,” (22) last year’s strikes did not fulfil all these conditions. Although, as
we have seen, the strikes effectively challenged the holders of power in the
factories, and the organisers did not hesitate to show several times over
that a significant proportion of the population living under the domination
of these power-holders was determined to fight for its demands, it is un-
clear whether they would have been able to extend a sustained challenge
to these power-holders. Indeed, for Tilly, a campaign extends beyond a sin-
gle event. (23)
Despite the effectiveness of the mobilisation, and the tactical and strate-
gic intelligence of the movement, it would seem that not much remains
today of the movement that caught the imagination of the Chinese and
unionists the world over last spring. The protests that spread rapidly to most
of the country were short-lived, and a year later it does not appear that
they resulted in the establishment of a permanent power struggle between
workers and bosses. The organisers of last year’s strikes became ordinary
workers again or left their factories, and no organisation capable of defend-
ing the workers or of expressing their demands seems to have been created.
Despite a certain propensity for self-criticism after the events, the All-China
Federation of Trade Unions has not altered its position. There are no au-
tonomous organisations and there have been no changes in behaviour by
official organisations. We are very far from the birth of a social movement. 
The power of a spectre
Nevertheless, the history of opposition in China shows that ideas and col-
lective behaviours can sometimes influence government policies even
though they are not structured into organisations capable of representing a
sustained challenge to those in power. In addition to Tilly’s criteria, we can
define a social movement by the effect it has on the policies of the power
holders. In this case, it is more than likely that the fear of a challenge taking
the form of the emergence of an interest group or union has led the author-
ities to anticipate the demands of potential protesters. If we analyse what
has happened in the field of relationships between labour and capital over
the last year, we realise that a certain number of attitudes have changed
and that this cannot be explained other than by last year’s movement.
We have seen that the right to strike has been denied by the law in China
since 1982, and that as a result, the waves of strikes that have shaken the
country over the last decade have led to severe repression. Generally
speaking, the CCP does not tolerate collective protests and does not hesi-
tate to take tough measures to “restore harmony.” The arrests and deploy-
ment of police that followed calls for a “jasmine revolution” in China
showed that the authorities were ready to mobilise considerable resources
to crush the least sign of opposition. The hefty increase in the proportion
of the budget allocated to “maintaining stability” (維穩 – weiwen) is an-
other example of this. (24) Nevertheless, police did not intervene during the
social conflicts that broke out in the Delta factories last year. Better still,
officials spoke in favour of the strikers. The former vice-president of the
Guangdong Federation of Unions, Kong Xianghong, for example, judged
that striking was not an illegal act but that it is “a means for workers to ex-
press their demands.” He also criticised the attitude of the union whose
members beat strikers during the strike at the Honda Nanhai factory. (25)
The changes are not limited to the declarations of one Guangdong union
leader. Last year, for example, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao stated that
salaries should be increased. (26) This does not perhaps signify a real change
of direction, but how are we to understand the announcement by the au-
thorities in 27 provinces that they would increase the minimum wage (27)
at the beginning of this year when the situation seemed calm? One might
put forward the hypothesis that the Communist Party is using anticipation
to arm itself against the emergence of an organised social movement. This
is suggested by the organisation of collective negotiations at the Nanhai
Honda factory at the end of 2010, negotiations that resulted in the an-
nouncement of substantial increases in wages for 2011 (560 yuan + 50
yuan). (28) Of course, we do not have any declarations that would allow us
to confirm this hypothesis, but the fact that no increase on this scale was
decided in previous years seems to show that the Spring 2010 movements
played a part. One might well conclude that the threat of a strike repre-
sents a form of sustainable challenge for the power holders.
Similarly, in July 2010, at the 15th meeting of its executive committee,
the All-China Federation of Trade Unions adopted a decision according to
which “the development of trade unions in companies in accordance with
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the law should be encouraged, as should collective bargaining over salaries
in accordance with the law.” (29) Similarly, following the strike at Honda,
workers were able to directly elect the head of the trade union, the mem-
bers of the committee of the union, and the vice-president of the union. (30)
Admittedly, this is an exceptional case, and workers elsewhere are not al-
lowed to choose their representatives. It does show, however, that the or-
ganisation, which, it will be remembered, had sent out its strong men to
crush the strikers, was forced to change its attitude.
Conclusion
A year after the strikes that shook the factories of the “world’s work-
shop,” tensions seem to have lessened. The concessions granted last year
by the management and the government in response to the spontaneous
actions of the workers have not led to the introduction of a collective bar-
gaining system in factories. Minimum wages have been increased, but this
is simply a question of making up for lost ground, since they had remained
unchanged for almost a decade. The government has repeated its wish to
improve the situation of workers of peasant origin, and intervenes more
willingly in cases where management does not pay wages that are due.
Unlike what happened in nineteenth-century Europe or during the 1980s
in South Korea, however, new trade unions capable of representing work-
ers’ demands have not been created. Despite several changes, the declara-
tions of those at the head of official unions that from now on they would
defend the interests of those they represent has proved a damp squib. It
cannot therefore be said that a workers’ movement has emerged.
It should be observed, however, that the protest repertoire is now com-
mon to all forms of resistance, whether on the part of workers, peasants,
or the middle-classes. Similarities in repertoire can be seen between the
workers’ resistance and the rights defence movement. The use of the Inter-
net to publicise abuses and to appeal to lawyers, the media, and finally to
researchers and university professors, are common elements in the protest
repertoires of these movements. Despite the absence of an organised
movement, this unity of repertoire constitutes a specific characteristic of
the socio-political situation in China, the influence of which cannot yet be
determined. However, when unity of discourse, action, and mobilisation
can be found in all social classes, we are in the presence of a significant
phenomenon and may well ask ourselves if it will not ultimately have an
influence on political debate and on the discourse of those in power. For
there will come a time when the authorities will have to take account of
this form of expression that is becoming increasingly widespread through-
out society.
z Translated by Elizabeth Guill
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